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I am grateful to be here and part of this panel and to discuss these
important issues.
Part of my goal as a member of this panel is to portray DoD's assessment
of some of the recent issues that have made up many of the topics for this
Conference. When military experts are asked to provide advice or an opinion
on a larger issue, we focus on the military interests. The same has been true of
these issues, including the Detainee Treatment Act,' the Supreme Court's
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,2 and the Military Commissions Act.3
In all of these cases, the military's interests have revolved around issues
germane to the law of war and military application of those laws. For example,
I know that a great discussion has begun around the habeus corpus stripping
provisions of the MCA. That is an aspect of the MCA that has very little
impact on the military. I don't have much to say about that issue. However, I
think there are three particular issues that have a significant impact on the
military and about which I would like to talk about. They are: first, Hamdan's
discounting of a "no law" zone by holding that Common Article 3 (CA3) of the
Geneva Conventions applies to all conflicts that are not between states; second,
the amendment to the War Crimes Act (WCA) which details "serious crimes"
under CA3; and third, the establishment of the minimum standards for
treatment of detainees on the battlefield by the DTA and Hamdan.
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I. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742-44.
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. (2006).
3. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in
scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter MCA].
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As I am sure you all know, the Geneva Conventions4 establish a three tier
paradigm for conflict classification. Common Article 2 describes armed
conflicts between states and applies the full body of the law of war to those
conflicts. Because there are a number of conflicts that are not between states,
either civil wars or other conflicts, the Geneva Conventions also contain
Common Article 3 which says that in armed conflicts "not of an international
character" "persons taking no active part in hostilities" get some protections
that do not equal those given to prisoners of war, but still represent a baseline
of humane treatment. Then, the Conventions, and particularly the
Commentary, 5 contemplate conflicts that do not rise to the level of armed
conflict but are typified as banditry or marauders. These are matters for
domestic law, which is governed by domestic legal standards and applicable
Human Rights Law. Because Human Rights Laws, like the ICCPR,6 are
designed to apply to the relationship between a state and the people of the state,
U.S. policy does not generally apply Human Rights Law extraterritorially;
instead, in military operations, the military applies the lex specialis of the Law
of Armed Conflict.
This seemingly trifurcated, or really bifurcated for the purposes of the
military, paradigm left some issues unresolved. In the years subsequent to the
Geneva Conventions, there has been debate concerning the coverage of CA2
and CA3. As early as 1951, Richard Baxter argued that unprivileged
belligerents received no protections under the Conventions but were "virtually
at the power of the enemy."7 After the terrorist attacks of Sept 11, 2001, the
Bush Administration took a similar approach and consistently asserted that
neither CA2 nor CA3 applied to detainees in the Global War on Terror
(GWOT).8
4. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Article 3 opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter GWS]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GSW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened
for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter GCC].
5. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=375&t=com (last visited, Mar. 17, 2007).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force for the United States Sept. 8, 1992).
7. Major Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 343 (1951).
8. See generally David E. Graham, The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and
Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 61 (2005).
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With the decision in Hamdan, it is now clear that CA3's coverage is broad
enough to cover unlawful combatants in the GWOT. The Supreme Court held:
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that
Common Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict
with al Qaeda, being "'international in scope,"' does not qualify as a
'conflict not of an international character."' 415 F.3d at 41. That
reasoning is erroneous. The term "conflict not of an international
character" is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between
nations. So much is demonstrated by the "fundamental logic [of] the
Convention's provisions on its application." Id., at 44 (Williams, J.,
concurring). Common Article 2 provides that "the present Convention
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties." 6 U.S.T., at 3318 (Art. 2, 1). High Contracting Parties
(signatories) also must abide by all terms of the Conventions vis-A-
vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a nonsignatory
"Power," and must so abide vis-a-vis the nonsignatory if "the latter
accepts and applies" those terms. Ibid. (Art. 2, 3). Common Article
3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full
protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with
neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory "Power" who are involved
in a conflict "in the territory of' a signatory. The latter kind of
conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common
Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations
(whether signatories or not). In context, then, the phrase "not of an
international character" bears its literal meaning. See, e.g., J.
Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 6,
296 (J. Bums & H. Hart eds. 1970) (using the term "international
law" as a "new though not inexpressive appellation" meaning
"betwixt nation and nation"; defining "international" to include
"mutual transactions between sovereigns as such"); Commentary on
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, p. 1351 (1987) ("[A] non-international armed conflict is
distinct from an international armed conflict because of the legal
status of the entities opposing each other").9
As a result of this holding, every armed conflict that US armed forces are
involved in invokes the protections of CA3. The standard appears to be the
existence of hostilities and the use of the regular armed forces. There is not a
"no law" zone where people can be excluded from receiving humane treatment
because the type of armed conflict doesn't seem to fit neatly into one of the two
9. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
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traditional categories. Rather the reach of international law covers all persons
on the battlefield during an armed conflict. Even in this strange but deadly war
against terrorism, that isn't against another state but crosses multiple
international boundaries, there is international law that guarantees all persons
will be treated humanely.
Though, as I will argue below, this didn't change the practical application
of treatment of military detainees, it provides a clear statement of why the
military's practice has been what it has been for the past several decades. It is
a pronouncement that the law of war has application to everyone in an armed
conflict, not just to those who fit the traditional paradigm.
The next issue that I think has had some significant impact on the military
is the amendment of the War Crimes Act. In passing the MCA, Congress
amended the WCA. In 1996, the WCA did not criminalize any violation of
Common Article 3. It was amended in 1997 to include all violations of CA3 as
a war crime.' ° This blanket coverage was, at least in part, in response to a
request by DoD." This coverage was too broad for fair and meaningful
application because not all violations of CA3 are criminal in nature. Some of
the more serious crimes, such as murder, mutilation, and torture are clearly
criminal and should be treated as war crimes. Other violations, such as some
10. Prior to the enactment of the MCA, 18 U.S.C. 2441 (2006) read:
a) Offense.-Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war
crime, in any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death results to the
victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death.
(b) Circumstances.-The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are that the
person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the
Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as defined in
section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
(c) Defmition.-As used in this section the term "war crime" means any conduct-
(1) defined as a grave breach in any of the international conventions signed at Geneva
12 August 1949, or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a
party;
(2) prohibited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV,
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 1907;
(3) which constitutes a grave breach of common Article 3 (as defined in subsection
(d)) when committed in the context of and in association with an armed conflict not
of an international character; or
(4) of a person who, in relation to an armed conflict and contrary to the provisions of
the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol H as amended on 3
May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes
serious injury to civilians.
11. Letter from Judith Miller to Honorable Bill McCollum, Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, H.R. 698, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996).
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forms of cruel treatment or humiliating and degrading treatment, may not
deserve to be considered a war crime but should be prohibited and sanctioned
in other ways.
12
This rationale is similar to that established to deal with grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions. Articles 129" of the GPW and 146'4 of the GCC
establish a bifurcated system for responding to violations of the law of war. In
the case of grave breaches, signatories accepted the obligation to pass laws that
criminalized violations, search for alleged offenders, and prosecute alleged
offenders or turn them over to another country that will prosecute them. "5 For
12. See John B. Bellinger mI, State Dept. Legal Advisor, State Dept. Briefing (Oct. 19, 2006),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/74786.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
13. GPW, supra note 4 at art. 129 states:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of
the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches,
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation,
hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all
acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches
defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and
defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and
those following of the present Convention.
14. GCC, supra note 4 at art. 146 states:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of
the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches,
and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation,
hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all
acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches
defined in the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and
defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and
those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of August 12, 1949.
15. GWS, supra note 4 at art. 50; GPW, supra note 4 at art. 130; GCC, supra note 4 at art. 147.
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non-grave breaches, the obligation is to "take measures necessary for the
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention."' 6
The MCA establishes a similar system which criminalizes as war crimes
the serious crimes from CA3, and allows other violations of CA3 to be
remedied through suppression, appropriate lesser criminal or administrative
sanctions, and retraining. I think this is an appropriate result. Serious crimes
need to be criminalized, but the military has a number of methods including
lesser criminal sanctions, nonjudicial punishment, administrative punishment
or separation, that are more appropriate methods for some less serious
violations.
Finally, as briefly mentioned above, the recent passage of the DTA and
decision in Hamdan have also focused the international law lens on CA3 and
the standards of treatment for detainees. The DTA prohibits cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment as defined by the 5th, 8th, and 14th
Amendments' jurisprudence on cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or
punishment. 7 This prohibition is sweeping in that it covers anyone "under the
physical control of the United States Government.' 18 In Hamdan, the Supreme
Court provided additional affirmation of the humane treatment standard by
applying CA3 to all non-international armed conflicts, including the GWOT.
In conjunction with the DTA's and Hamdan's establishment of a minimum
standard of treatment for battlefield detainees, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gordon England instructed all military units to verify that "all DoD personnel
adhere to [Common Article 3].''19 The DEPSECDEF memo was an important
affirmation of the minimum standards for conduct, under the Law of War.
However, this was unnecessary as the military has been applying an even higher
standard, that of giving every detainee prisoner of war treatment until otherwise
instructed, as a matter of policy2" for at least two decades. It has been and
continues to be the policy of the United States military to treat all detainees
humanely and as Prisoners of War, until otherwise directed by competent
16. GCC, supra note 4, at art. 146.
17. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148 at 2742-44.
18. Id.
19. Memorandum from Gordon England, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, on the Application of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense
(Jul. 7, 2006), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/genevaconsmemo.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM (Dec. 9, 1998), available at http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf/d5l0077_120998/
d510077p.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2007) which states:
5.3. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
5.3.1. Ensure that the members of their DoD Components comply with the law of war
during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the
principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.
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authority. This treatment does not establish status, but does provide a standard
of treatment that exceeds that required by either the DTA or Hamdan.
This GPW-based standard of treatment has recently been confirmed in the
promulgation of DoD Directive 2310.1 E, "DoD Detainee Program,",2' and FM
2-22.3, "Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 2 2 The Directive and FM
require all detainees, including unlawful combatants, be treated consistent with
the requirements of CA3 as a minimum standard. They also reiterate the GPW
standards for prisoners of war. The Directive further enumerates specifically
prohibited acts such as murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the
taking of hostages, collective punishments, execution without trial by proper
authority, and all cruel and degrading treatment, in accordance with and as
defined in U.S. law; threats or acts of violence, including rape, forced
prostitution, assault and theft, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals;
being subjected to medical or scientific experiments; and protects against being
subjected to sensory deprivation.
I believe that the events of the past five years have highlighted and
illustrated the wisdom and practical efficiency in DoD's approach to treatment
of detainees, and I think that has been borne out by the subsequent actions of
the President, Congress and courts.
In conclusion, I think these three recent events:
1) Hamdan's discounting of a "no law" zone by holding that CA3
of the Geneva Conventions applies to all conflicts that are not
between states;
2) The amendment to the WCA to detail "serious crimes" under
CA3; and
3) The establishment of humane treatment as the minimum
standards for treatment of detainees on the battlefield by the
DTA and Hamdan
demonstrate the continuing vitality of the law of war and its effects on
international law.
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEP'T OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 2310.01E, DEP'T OF DEFENSE
DETAINEE PROGRAM (Sep. 5, 2006), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/DetaineePrgm_
Dir_2310_9-5-06.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2007).
22. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS (Sep. 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ftn2-22-3.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2007).
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